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I. DEFENDANTS5 ASSERTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE 
CONVENIENCE TO THE DOMINANT ESTATE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n construing any grant of right of way the 
use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to 
the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use 
contemplated." Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1133 (Utah 1916). Defendants have alleged 
that the record shows many instances where it is clear that the trial court did in fact consider 
what was reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate. In reviewing the 
evidence presented at trial, the court will apply the clear error standard which means, 
Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ or the 
appellate court must reach a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made'." 
Power Systems & Controls, Inc., v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); quoting In re T.R.F., 760 p.2d 906, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In this case, the clear 
weight of the evidence demonstrates that the trial court failed to consider what was 
reasonably necessary and convenient to the Plaintiff. 
First, Defendants cite paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact, in which the trial court 
concluded "[i]t would be extremely difficult to move a front-end loader or truck from the 
Defendants' sand and gravel pit up to the Plaintiffs property on the particular [Gravel Pit] 
road." R. at 157: 10. Although Defendants argue that this statement "considers what is 
reasonably necessary and convenient to the Plaintiff," the court has utterly failed to note that 
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the inconvenience created by this difficulty is negligible compared with the difficulty of 
moving a front-end loader or truck to Plaintiffs property from the east on the "East Road," 
where the court actually granted an easement. The difficulties of navigating any portion of 
the Gravel Pit Road are negligible to the Plaintiff compared with the difficulties he would 
encounter trying to reach his property on what has been termed the "East Road." 
For example, the evidence presented at trial makes clear that the East Road is 
"impassable" and that "[f]or a truck, a semi or a loaded, load of equipment of any kind to 
haul materials in there from the east side would be totally impossible." R. at 40: 7-20. This 
testimony was not rebutted. No evidence was presented that any heavy equipment had ever 
traversed the "East Road" to Plaintiffs property. It is clear from the record that the Gravel 
Pit Road is not only reasonably necessary to access the Plaintiffs' property with heavy 
equipment, but it is clearly the only passable, and therefore the only convenient route for 
Plaintiffs' use. 
Second, Defendants cite paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact, in which the trial court 
stated "[a] substantial amount of work would be required to place a permanent road through 
Defendants' sand and gravel pit and make it possible for the kind of equipment and trucks 
Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from Defendants' pit onto the North West corner of 
Plaintiffs property." R. at 158. While it is true that it would take a substantial amount of 
work to place a permanent road through Defendants' sand and gravel pit, it is clear from the 
record that a substantially greater amount of work would be needed to cut a road to access 
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Plaintiffs property from the east, in order to create or finish the proposed East Road. 
Specifically, Plaintiff proffered the testimony of Mr. Cartwright who estimated that it would 
cost approximately $24,000 to improve the north access road [North Road] and "if somebody 
were somehow miraculously to cut a road from the east it would be even double that." R. at 
549: 4-10. This testimony was not rebutted. The trial court completely failed to consider 
which route would be reasonably necessary and convenient to the Plaintiff and simply 
focused its attention on the alleged difficulties Defendants alleged with access via the Gravel 
Pit Road. 
Finally, the defendants cite paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact, in which the trial 
court specifically noted "[t]hat road has since fallen into disrepair, as it has not served as the 
primary western entrance to Defendants' property since approximately 1962 to 1963, when 
the Gravel Pit Road was built." R. at 158, emphasis added. Whether or not the road has 
served as the primary western entrance to Defendants' property is irrelevant. Whether the 
road served as the primary entrance to Plaintiffs property (which is relevant) was not even 
considered by the Court in its findings. The Plaintiff does not deny the fact that a portion of 
the road has fallen into disrepair. However, it is important to clarify the reason why a 
portion of the road has fallen into disrepair. The cause of action before the court was not 
solely an action for the determination of an easement. A forcible detainer action was also 
brought before the court in which the trial court held that "it is clear that Plaintiff is entitled 
to be restored access to his land." R. at 152. Because Plaintiff was forcibly detained from 
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access to his property, he has been unable to maintain the above-stated portion of road. The 
trial court has failed to consider what is reasonably necessary and convenient to Plaintiff. 
II. THE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION THAT THE RECORD CLEARLY SUPPORTS 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE EAST ROAD IS THE MOST 
TRAVERSED ROAD IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
The Defendants correctly cited the standard of review as clear error. See Br. of 
Appellees at 10. Under the clear error standard, Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' or the appellate court must reach a 'definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made'." Power Systems & Controls, Inc., v. Keith's 
Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); quoting In re T.R.K, 760 p.2d 906, 
90 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Defendants admitted that contradictory evidence was 
presented at trial, as should be expected. See Br. of Appellees at 14. However, in 
considering all the evidence presented at trial, the clear weight does not support the position 
that the East Road is the most traversed Road. See Br. of Appellees at 14. Each of 
Plaintiffs responses to the Defendants' brief will be dealt with in turn below. 
A. DESPITE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTIONS, PLAINTIFF DISCLOSED 
CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE EAST ROAD IS NOT THE MOST 
TRAVERSED ROAD 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not disclosed all of the evidence in the record that 
supports the fact that the East Road is the most traversed road. See Br. of Appellees at 14. 
Defendants have alleged that Plaintiff has understated the evidence which was supplied 
4 
regarding the suitability of the East Road. See Br. of Appellees at 14. Defendants provided 
a list of items which they allege were understated by the Plaintiff. However, not only has the 
Plaintiff addressed the evidence mentioned in the Defendant's brief, but the Plaintiff has also 
shown the lack of credibility associated with said evidence. 
For example, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not disclosed or has 
understated the comment by Mr. Robinson that he had "seen people travel [the East Road] all 
the time." See Br. of Appellees at 14. Despite the Defendants' claim, the issue was directly 
addressed by Plaintiff and not taken out of context as was done by the Defendants. The 
Plaintiff clearly noted that Mr. Robinson stated "every night you can see lights out there and 
I've seen people travel it all the time." See Br. of Aplt. at 10. In considering the weight of 
the evidence, the testimony of Mr. Robinson's remains at issue. The Defendants have 
understated and failed to disclose that Mr. Robinson's observation was made from his farm 
at night from "a mile and a half or two miles" away, and that Mr. Robinson had only been on 
the East Road twice. R. at 491: 7-11. 
In determining what weight to give evidence presented in this case, the Defendants 
correctly state that is not the quantity of evidence that ultimately determines whether the trial 
court was correct, it is the quality of the evidence that was presented. See Br. of Appellees at 
15. In this case, both the quantity and the quality of the evidence clearly show that the trial 
court's determination that the East Road was the most traversed was made against the weight 
of the evidence. 
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The Plaintiff marshaled evidence which clearly demonstrates that the Gravel Pit Road 
is the most traversed road and that the trial court's decision was against the weight of the 
evidence. The State of Utah and Millard County have used the Gravel Pit Road with large 
trucks to remove sand and gravel. R. at 145: 6. In fact, the State of Utah and Millard 
County graded the road leading into the sand and gravel pit during removal operations. Id. 
For this reason, Mr. Edwards described the Gravel Pit road as a graded and good road. R. at 
349: 13-14. 
Additionally, Mr. Edwards described the regular use of the Gravel Pit Road by 
testifying that "Up to the time the gate was locked, there was . . . trucks in and out of there 
[the Gravel Pit Road] the biggest, big part of the time, sometimes every day, sometimes 
maybe only once a week, but when we were hauling for Carlings we hauled every day 
about.55 R. at 363: 23-24; R. at 364: 1-3. 
Finally, the evidence clearly showed that the Gravel pit road is the only road a truck 
could travel to reach the Plaintiffs property. R. at 349: 22-23. With regard to the East 
Road, Mr. Edwards testified that the East Road was steeper than the Gravel Pit road, saying, 
"For a truck, a semi or a leader, loaded, load of equipment of any kind to haul material in 
there from the east side would be totally impossible.55 R. at 346: 7-14. Defendants offered 
no evidence that any truck could use the East Road to travel the entire distance to the 
Plaintiffs property. Mr. McBride testified that trucks have traveled the portion of the East 
Road leading to the Carling gravel pit (which is within ten feed of McBride lane), but no 
6 
witness testified ever having seen a truck travel on the bulk of the East Road, which is 
between two and three miles in length. Traffic seen near the East Road by Mr. Robinson 
was limited to his observation of lights seen at night from his farm a mile and a half or two 
miles west of the East Road. R. at 184: 11-13; R. at 184: 8. The weight of the evidence 
clearly does not suggest that large equipment, as would be used by Plaintiff, has been seen 
"chasing around" the East Road during the day or at night. 
B. CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, THE RECORD 
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED 
PLAIN ERROR IN ACCEPTING MR. MCBRIDE'S AND MR. 
ROBINSON'S TESTIMONY THAT THE EAST ROAD WAS "WELL 
USED" OR "WELL TRAVELED" 
The Supreme Court has held that u[a]bsent a timely objection, we will review an 
alleged error only it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes 'plain error'." State v. 
Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989); citing Utah R. Evid. 103(d); State v. Eldredge, 773 
P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989); and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). Specifically 
the Court has determined that the "requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error be 
'plain,' i.e., from our examination of the record, we must be able to say that it should have 
been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error. State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 
(Utah 1989); citing State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2nd 113, 117—18, 441 P.2d 512; 514—15 (1968), 
appeal after remand, 24 Utah 2nd 335, 471 P.2d 870 (1970). The premise of this rule is that 
"the ends of justice must not be lost sight of in the pursuit of procedural regularity and that 
when an error is plain, a trial court can legitimately be said to have had a reasonable 
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opportunity to address and correct it, even in the absence of an objection. Id. at 36. The 
second and somewhat interrelated requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error 
affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful. Id.; citing State v. 
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985). 
In this case the ends of justice would be lost and Plaintiffs rights would be 
substantially affected if the Court were not to review the objection that there was no 
foundation for the statements of Mr. McBride and Mr. Robinson that the East Road was 
"well used." First, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. None of 
Defendants' witnesses gave testimony with regard to the East Road of the quality of Glayde 
Edwards' testimony regarding the use of the Gravel Pit Road. No witness designated the sort 
of traffic that might have used the East Road frequently. No comparison of any objective 
measurement was made between the East Road and the Gravel Pit Road. 
The Defendants have alleged that adequate foundation was laid. With regards to Mr. 
McBride's statement that the East Road was a well used road, the Defendants simply allege 
that Mr. McBride owned the property at issue and was extremely familiar with the geography 
of the area and had been on the property. However, at no point did Mr. McBride give 
estimates vehicular or other traffic on the East Road. He simply stated that it was well used 
and a good road. R. at 504:1. Additionally, Mr. McBride testified that trucks have traveled 
the portion of the East Road leading to the Carling gravel pit (which is within ten feed of 
McBride lane), but no witness testified ever having seen a truck travel on the bulk of the East 
Road, which is between two and three miles in length. 
Additionally, the Defendants have claimed that proper foundation existed for Mr. 
Robinson's testimony that the East Road is well traveled because Mr. Robinson had been on 
the East Road one month prior to the trial. Br. of Appellees at 16. However, Defendants 
have understated Mr. Robinson's testimony by failing to mention that Mr. Robinson never 
testified to having seen traffic travel the East Road, except late at night, "chasing around." 
Defendants also failed to mention that Mr. Robinson had never been on the East Road prior 
to his single experience one month before the trial. Mr. Robinson gave no estimate of daily, 
weekly, monthly, or annual vehicular or other traffic on the East Road. He gave no 
information regarding actual vehicles seen during his single visit to the East Road. The only 
testimony of travel on the East Road provided by Mr. Robinson was his observation of lights 
seen at night from his farm a mile and a half or two miles west of the East Road. R. at 184: 
11-13; R. at 184: 8. It can be legitimately said, that with all the evidence presented, that the 
trial court had a reasonable opportunity to address and correct foundational questions, which 
it failed to do. 
Second, the plain error committed by the trial court clearly affects the substantial 
rights of the Plaintiff. As a result of the unfounded testimony of Mr. McBride and Mr. 
Robinson, the trial court determined that the East Road is the most traversed road. 
Unfortunately, the simple truth is that the East Road - along the length Plaintiff would be 
required to use - is impassable. As a result of the trial court's decision, Plaintiff is still 
unable to access his property with heavy equipment. Plaintiff simply cannot access his 
property with heavy equipment via the East Road. He could, however, access his property 
via the Gravel Pit Road, despite the small difficulties noted in the Gravel Pit Road by the 
trial court. 
Plaintiff has incurred significant losses as the result of being unable to access his 
property. He spent at least $37,754.41 in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and construction 
material in anticipation of business activities on his property which Defendants' actions have 
prevented him from pursuing. (R. at 148: 18). 
C. DESPITE THE ASSERTIONS OF DEFENDANTS, THE TESTIMONY OF 
MR. ROBINSON CLEARLY INDICATES THAT PORTIONS OF THE 
EAST ROAD NO LONGER EXIST 
Defendants have argued that Plaintiff has merely pulled excerpts of testimony from 
the record out of context to create an issue that, upon more careful examination of the record, 
does not exist. Br. of Appellees at 16. However, a careful examination of Mr. Robinson's 
testimony reveals that not only is his testimony inconsistent, but that, many portions of the 
East Road referenced to in Mr. Robinson's testimony no longer exist. The difficulty in 
evaluating the testimony of Mr. Robinson involves a web of constantly changing trails on the 
East side of Plaintiff s property. 
First, Mr. Robinson controverted his own testimony by describing the East Road (for 
hunting purposes as the 'road that don't exist'" (R. at 489: 18-19) and at the same time 
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describing the East Road as a "good road." R. at 483: 16-19, 22. There are trails to the East 
of Plaintiff s property that can be described as "good," however, the majority of the trail 
system is correctly described as a web of changing trails, many of which no longer exist. A 
closer examination of Mr. Robinson testimony reveals the condition of the east portion of the 
East Road to which Mr. Robinson stated "Well, at the east end don't exist." R. at 489: 20-
21. This portion of the East Road had been closed off close to the Davies' dairy. See R. at 
490: 1-2. 
The Defendants would have the Court believe that despite the extensive web of 
changing trails, a constant path remains. This conclusion is simply not supported by the 
weight of the evidence. Defendant McBride stated that the East Road had been blocked off 
in about 1970 when the dairy was built across the road. See R. at 513: 11-16. Defendant 
McBride then classified the east trail system as a "good road" to Plaintiffs property. 
Specifically, the trail to Plaintiffs property was described as "[tjhere's the McBride Lane 
over here and this ... gravel pit around here this road back to [Plaintiffs] property." R. at 
513: 21-23. This "over here" then "around here" then "back to" description highlight the 
elaborate web of changing trails to the east of Plaintiff s property. 
Interestingly, Defendant McBride described, as part of the East Road, a path which, at 
one point, passes directly through a third-party's gravel pit. The trial court specifically noted 
its concern with the Gravel Pit Road by stating "[t]here is no defined road through the 
Defendants' sand and gravel pit because it constantly changes as trucks and other equipment 
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move through the pit to remove sand and gravel.55 R. at 146: 10, 147: 10; It is unclear how a 
path which passes directly through a third-party's gravel pit will resolve tlie above-stated 
concern. 
In this case, the web of changing trails do not and have not provided a consistent path 
to Plaintiffs property. Mr. Edwards described the East Road as "a four-wheel drive road or 
an ATV trail, 'used to be a wagon road5 but that 'you couldn't haul on it5.55 R. at 346: 15-17. 
At no point, have Defendants produced any evidence that the entire East Road trail system to 
the Plaintiffs property is passable at all. The weight of the evidence clearly suggests 
otherwise. 
In contrast to the web of changing trails to the east of Plaintiff s property, the Gravel 
Pit Road has been an established road since at least 1958 as seen in the aerial photographical 
map taken in 1958. See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 8. (Addendum "A55 provides the court 
record of all exhibits which were admitted at trial). Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 9 clearly 
shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1965. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 10 
clearly shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1974. Plaintiffs5 Trial Exhibit 
No. 11 clearly shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1983. Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit No. 12 clearly shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1993. Plaintiffs 
Trial Exhibit No. 13 clearly shows that an established Gravel Pit Road existed in 1993. In 
contrast, the above-listed exhibits clearly demonstrated web of changing trails to the east of 
Plaintiffs property, many of which no longer exist. 
D. DESPITE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, MR. EDWARDS TESTIMONY IS 
CONSEQUENTIAL 
As mentioned above, the Defendants have correctly stated that it is not the quantity of 
evidence that ultimately determines whether the trial court was correct; it is the quality of the 
evidence. The Defendants have admitted that evidence they presented at trial contradicts the 
evidence of Mr. Edwards. The testimony of Mr. Edwards should not be dismissed as 
inconsequential simply because it is contradicted by other evidence. The quality of Mr. 
Edward's testimony is demonstrated in its specificity and its reference to experience over a 
period of time. The quality of Mr. Edwards' testimony greatly exceeds that of the 
Defendants' witnesses, was not controverted, and was consistent. 
The testimony of Mr. Edwards demonstrates that the decision of the trial court was 
clearly erroneous because it was against the weight of the evidence. Mr. Edwards, who is 
experienced in road work and heavy equipment travel, (R. at 339: 1-24) testified that "[u]p to 
the time the gate was locked, there was ... trucks in and out of there [the Gravel Pit Road] 
the biggest, big part of the time, sometimes every day, sometimes maybe only once a week, 
but when we were hauling for Carlings we hauled every day about. (R. at 362: 23-24; R. at 
363: 1-3). He further testified that the Gravel Pit Road was "the only road [trucks] could 
haul on." (R. at 363:8). In contrast to the Gravel Pit Road, Mr. Edwards testified that from 
the east, "For a truck, a semi or loaded, load of equipment of any kind to haul material in 
there from the east side would be totally impassable" (R. at 346:11-14). 
Finally, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs concluding paragraph of Point II of 
Plaintiffs brief draws unsupported conclusions and should be ignored. See Br. of Appellees 
at 20. Plaintiff notes that Defendants never offered any evidence that a truck could use the 
East Road to travel the entire distance to Plaintiffs property. See Br. of Aplt. at 11-12. To 
refute this statement, Defendants refer to the testimony of Mr. Robinson's nightly 
observation of lights from his farm a mile and a half to two miles away in which he 
concluded that the lights were those of trucks. R. at 490: 14-19. However, at no point have 
Defendants offered any evidence that trucks have been seen traveling the entire distance of 
the East Road to the Plaintiffs property. Rather, the vehicles where simply seen "chasing 
around." R. at 491: 11. 
Moreover, Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs classification of vehicles which were 
described as "chasing around" must have been "light vehicles of a recreational nature 
(ATV's for example)" is self-serving and lacks foundation. See Br. of Appellees at 20. No 
foundation was ever laid for Mr. Robinson's unique ability to determine the existence of a 
truck, car, or ATV simply by viewing headlights at night from at about a mile and a half to 
two miles away. 
III. DESPITE THE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, THE RECORD DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO ALLOW AN EASEMENT 
ON THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD 
The Defendants have argued eight different reasons why the record supports the trial 
court's decision not to allow an easement on the gravel pit road. See Br. of Appellees at 21-
14 
26. Each of the Defendants' contentions on this point will be dealt with in turn below. In 
discussing the eight points, it is important to point out that the clear error standard, which is, 
that the Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
or the appellate court must reach a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made'." Power Systems, 765 P.2d at 9. In this case, the trial court's decision not to allow an 
easement through the Gravel Pit Road is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
First, the Defendants argued that Plaintiff should not be granted access through the 
Gravel Pit Road because Plaintiff has failed to take the substantial steps necessary haul 
gravel and conduct mining operations. See Br. of Appellees at 21. It is unclear how this 
assertion relates to Plaintiffs convenience in accessing his property. However, the trial court 
found that Plaintiff spent $37,754.41 in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and construction 
materials for a structure on the property, but somehow concluded that the expenditure was 
not a "substantial step." R. at 148: 18; R. at 149: 18. Specifically, the trial court determined 
that while the Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine, haul sand and gravel, 
build structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented also showed that Plaintiff 
failed to take the substantial steps necessary to make these desires a reality by obtaining the 
required permits, or entering into contracts. However, any lack of action on the part of 
Plaintiff can be attributed directly to Defendants, as the result of Defendants' forcible 
detainer. In regards to the forcible detainer action, the trial court simply concluded that "it is 
clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land." R. at 152. 
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Second, the Defendants appear to refute Plaintiffs argument that the East Road "does 
not support heavy vehicular traffic." Br. of Appellees at 22. Defendants support their 
argument by stating that Mr. Robinson testified that he had seen "cars or pickup . . . [o]r 
bigger trucks" traveling on the East Road. Br. of Appellees at 22. Again, the Defendants 
have understated and failed to disclose all of Mr. Robinson testimony. Specifically, Mr. 
Robinson's observations were made at night from his farm a mile and a half to two miles 
away and his testimony was based on his unique ability to decipher the nature of headlights 
from a large distance at night. R. at 490: 14-19. The clear weight of Mr. Robinson's 
testimony does not support the finding that the East Road is suitable for heavy vehicular 
traffic required by Plaintiff. 
Third, Defendants attack Plaintiffs argument that the Gravel Pit Road is the only 
convenient access to Plaintiffs property. However, their refutation simply analyzes the 
burden to the Defendants as the result of Plaintiff s use of the Gravel Pit Road. Again, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n construing any grant of right of way the use, in 
character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to the 
dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use 
contemplated." Morris v. Blunt, 161 P.1127, 1133 (Utah 1916). The trial court completely 
ignored what is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate. 
Fourth, Defendants appear to refute Plaintiffs argument that the Gravel Pit Road is 
the only convenient location for an easement because it is a well-maintained road. To 
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support their argument, Defendants first point out that the problems with the portion of the 
Gravel Pit Road leading away from the gravel pit and the detriment to the Defendants' estate. 
See Br. of Appellees at 23. Problems leading away from the gravel pit are a result of 
disrepair and lack of maintenance as a result of the Plaintiff being forcibly detained from 
access to his property. The detriments to the Defendants will be discussed at length latter. 
Neither statements refute Plaintiffs argument that the Gravel Pit Road is the most convenient 
location for an easement. 
Additionally, Defendants note that there is no defined road through the sand and 
gravel pit because it constantly changes as trucks and other equipment move through the pit 
to remove sand and gravel pit. Br. of Appellees at 23. Surprisingly, with the constant 
changes noted above, the record does not reflect any difficulties the Defendants themselves 
have had in using the Gravel Pit Road, nor does the record show that any other party, 
including Plaintiff, has ever complained about difficulty in using the Gravel Pit Road. 
Further, Defendants noted that the trial court found that a "substantial amount of work 
would be required to place a permanent road through Defendant's sand and gravel pit and 
make it possible for the kind of equipment and trucks Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from 
Defendant's pit onto the North West Corner of Plaintiff s property." However, as noted in 
Plaintiffs brief, the trial court has committed clear error by simply failing to address or 
consider what would be the most convenient to the Plaintiff. While it is correct to state that 
work will be needed to improve the Gravel Pit Road to the Plaintiffs property, the record 
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clearly indicates that it would cost considerably less to improve the Gravel Pit Road than to 
construct a passable road from the east. 
Fifth, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff has in someway mischaracterized a public 
hearing held in 1999 which considered the use of the Gravel Pit Road. See Br. of Appellee 
at 24. The record speaks for itself and clearly demonstrates that the use of the Gravel Pit 
Road was discussed. The Defendants would suggest that the hearing addressed the "rampant 
problem of trespassing," (Br. of Appellees at 24) however, the trial court specifically stated 
that contentions existed regarding "trespassers and access." R. at 146: 9. A determination 
was made following that hearing that the Gravel Pit Road was not a county road. R. at 146: 
9. 
Sixth, the Defendants objected to the proffered testimony of Mr. Cartwright which 
clearly highlights the extensive cost associated with the improvement of the East Road. Br. 
of Appellees at 24. Specifically, Mr. Cartwright's estimated that it would cost approximately 
$24,000 to improve the north access road [North Road] and "if somebody were somehow 
miraculously to cut a road from the east it would be even double that" R. at 549: 4-10. 
Although the Defendants argue that "during the trial, the court was presented with evidence 
from several sources regarding the condition of all the roads" (Br. of Appellees at 24) no 
evidence was ever presented by Defendants which addressed the cost of clearing or 
constructing the East Road versus the cost of repairing the Gravel Pit Road. Additionally, no 
testimony was offered to rebut the testimony of Mr. Cartwright that the cost of repairing the 
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East Road would be extensive. The trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous because it 
failed to consider the convenience to Plaintiff with regards to the costs associated with 
repairing the East Road. 
Seventh, Defendants argue that the record supports the trial court's decision not to 
allow Gravel Pit Road access in the testimony of Mr. Robinson that the final stretch of the 
Gravel Pit Road leading into Plaintiffs property was "possible but its just really rough." R. 
at 492: 5. It is understandable that the final stretch from the Gravel Pit Road to Plaintiffs 
property would be rough. Plaintiff has been forcibly detained from access to this route and 
has been unable to make repairs to a very limited stretch of the Gravel Pit Road. The trial 
court clearly ruled that Plaintiff had been denied access to his properly and that it is clear that 
he is "entitled to be restored access to his land." R. at 152. However, as noted above, the 
testimony of Mr. Cartwright clearly suggest that the cost of repairing the Gravel Pit Road 
would be considerably less than construction of the East Road. 
Finally, the Defendants suggest that the testimony of Mr. Edwards that "the repair or 
construction of the East Road for the Plaintiffs purposes is not feasible because the East 
Road traverses the property of third parties who are not parties to this action" (Br. of 
Appellees at 13) falls short of mustering an appropriate amount of evidence to show clear 
error. Interestingly, the Defendants do not refute the testimony of Mr. Edwards on this point. 
Thus, in considering the weight of the evidence presented on this point, it is important to 
note that no contrary evidence was even presented by the Defendants to suggest the 
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feasibility of repairing or constructing the East Road. The lack of evidence presented by the 
Defendants on this point further demonstrates that the trial court's decision was made against 
the clear weight of the evidence. 
IV. DESPITE THE DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, THE RECORD DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT AN EASEMENT 
THROUGH THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD WOULD PRESENT AN EXCESSIVE 
BURDEN TO DEFENDANTS 
Again, the Utah Supreme Court had held that, "In construing any grant of right of 
way, the use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and 
convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible 
for the use contemplated." Morris v. Blunt, 161P.1127, 1133 (Utah 1916). This rule clearly 
contemplates that some burden to the servient estate will exist. 
In this case, the trial court, instead of considering what is reasonably necessary and 
convenient to the dominant estate, focused its analysis on the burdens to the servient estate. 
While an easement through the Gravel Pit Road might create a slight burden on the 
Defendants, no evidence was presented that the burden would be excessive. Additionally, 
any burden which might be speculated to accrue to the Defendants by granting access via the 
Gravel Pit Road would enure to third-party owners of property surrounding the East Road if 
access is affirmed from the east, which property owners have not previously allowed heavy 
equipment to traverse their property, and who are not parties to this action. 
Defendants argue that placing the easement on the Gravel Pit Road creates obstacles 
for the Defendants in trying to prevent trespass and theft. Br. of Appellees at 28. 
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Defendants offered the testimony of Sheriff Phillips who testified that he had received 
complaints from Defendants regarding trespassing on the property, specifically, where 
Plaintiff was involved. R. at 499; 13-21, 501: 5-8 and 504: 22-25. Again, the Defendants 
have understated and failed to disclose all relevant facts. The Plaintiff was never cited or 
arrested for trespass and when the Sheriff made contact with Plaintiff, he was "on his [own] 
property." R. at 505:1-15. The single trespass incident involving Plaintiff was Plaintiffs 
attempt to gain access to his own property from which he was being forcibly detained by 
Defendants. R. at 152. This testimony does not show that an easement through the Gravel 
Pit Road would increase trespass. No evidence was presented that providing an easement 
through the Gravel Pit Road would increase trespass. No testimony was presented that the 
Plaintiff would negligently leave a gate open or unlocked. No testimony was presented to 
indicate that Plaintiff would engage in theft if provided access to his property via the Gravel 
Pit Road. 
Further, Defendants have alleged that granting Plaintiff access to the Gravel Pit Road 
would in some way decrease the value to Defendants' property. Br. of Appellees at 27. 
Specifically, Defendant Jack McBride was asked "if there is access across your property, if 
the access, if an easement were granted right in the middle of your property would that make 
your property in your opinion less valuable?" R. at 539: 6-10. To which, Defendant 
McBride answered "[l]ess valuable for the future." R. at 539: 11. It is important to note that 
Defendant McBride did not specify as to how much value would be lost. Defendants offered 
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no other testimony to support Defendant McBride's assertion that said property would be 
less valuable "in the future." 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the rule expounded in Morris contemplates that 
some burden will exist to the servient estate. The burden should be as little burdensome as 
possible while still providing access that is reasonably necessary and convenient to the 
dominant estate. In this case, the trial court committed clear error by failing to considering 
the access reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate, and simply attempted 
to eliminate any burden to the servient estate. The trial court should have balanced its 
findings on what access is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate with 
the use which is as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible. 
V. DESPITE THE ASSERTION OF THE DEFENDANTS THAT PLAINTIFF 
CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES, SECTION 78-36-10(2) OF THE UTAH CODE 
MANDATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRANT DAMAGES FOR 
SUCCESSFUL FORCIBLE DETAINER ACTIONS. 
The Defendants have correctly noted that "[b]ecause the adequacy of damages is a 
question of fact, [a reviewing court] cannot overturn the trial court's findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous." In re Estate of Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 
1996). Additionally, section 78-36-10(2) of the Utah Code provides that "The jury or the 
court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also 
assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: . . . (b) forcible or 
unlawful detainer. (Emphasis added). 
In this case, the Plaintiff was forcibly detained from access to his property by the 
Defendants, and was entitled to recover damages. The trial court correctly found that "It is 
clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored to access to his land." R. at 152. However, the 
trial court declined to provide damages stating that the Plaintiff has failed to provide the 
court with enough evidence for the court to award damages (R. at 152) even though the trial 
court specifically found that Plaintiff spent money in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and 
construction materials in an amount of $37,754.41. R. at 149. 
Compensatory damages may be recovered in a forcible detainer case as in any other 
tort. An analysis of this is set forth in Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944) in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Larsen. The damages complained of in the present case for 
interest on amounts spent by the Plaintiff for equipment and construction materials are 
analogous to the examples of damages noted as permitted for interference with business 
prospects. 
The interest is compensatory damage which occurred as the result of Defendants' 
conduct. Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs use of the materials which he purchased 
exclusively for use on the subject property. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 931, 
Division 13, Chapter 47, Topic 3, Compensatory Damages, clause (b). Although when 
Plaintiff recovers possession of his land and is able to access the same, he will then be able 
to make use of the purchased equipment, he has been deprived of that value for a known 
period of time. The interest is an easily determined value which is a consequence of having 
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been deprived of access to his property. Plaintiff has been forcibly detained frbm his 
property at least since December of 2002 when Defendants erected the fences set forth in the 
Findings of Fact, paragraph 3. The equipment and construction materials had been 
purchased prior to that time. Interest accruing at 10% per annum (U.C.A. §15-1-1) on 
$37,754.41 from December of 2002 through November of 2003 is $11,326.32. 
Plaintiff also incurred attorney's fees in filing suit to cure the unlawful detainer. 
Plaintiff was not allowed to present any evidence of attorney's fees incurred in restoring 
access to land from which he had been forcibly detained. 
The trial court stated "[w]hile Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine, 
haul sand and gravel, build structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented 
also showed that Plaintiff had failed to take the substantial steps necessary to make these 
desires a reality by obtaining the required permits, or entering into contracts." R. at 152. 
The Record shows, however, that Plaintiff did obtain a Mineral Lease in 1999, obtained a 
well permit in 2001, and has an owner's right to remove common sand and gravel from the 
property. R. at 148. Requiring the Plaintiff to have entered into contracts in order to be liable 
for any damage, when Defendants had begun setting fences depriving Plaintiff of access to 
his property as early as September, 1998, (R. at 450) is not reasonable. 
A person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either: (1) by force or by menaces and 
threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession of any real property, whether 
the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise. § 78-36-2 U.C.A. The trial court clearly 
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held that "Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land." R. at 152. A forcible 
detainer does not require a Plaintiff to take substantial step to be entitled to damages. A 
forcible detainer action only requires the defendant be guilty of a forcible detainer. Because 
the Defendants were held to have forcibly detained Plaintiff from access to his property, the 
statute mandates the assessment of damages. The trial court committed clear error by failing 
to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court's 
Ruling was clearly erroneous in the following regards: 
1. Considering only what was burdensome to the servient estate, and failing to address 
or consider the issue what was reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate. 
2. Finding that the East Road is "the most traversed road." 
3. After determining that Plaintiff had been forcibly detained from his property since 
1999, failing to award Plaintiff damages as mandated by statute. 
Plaintiff is entitled to relief from the final judgment of the trial court, including 
granting the Plaintiff reasonably necessary and convenient access to his property, together 
with damages and attorney fees from Defendant's forcible detainer. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3rd day of November 2005 
WILFORD N.HANSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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